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Beware of lawyers bearing gifts: A critical evaluation of the Report of WG II to the 
European Convention on incorporation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and accession to the European Convention of Human Rights.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article undertakes a critical analysis of the fundamental rights provisions of the draft 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe as presented to the President of the 
European Council in Rome on 18 July 2003 (the “draft Constitution”),1 and in particular 
the Articles in Parts I and II of the draft Constitution incorporating proposals made in the 
final Report of Working Group II (“WG II”) on “Incorporation of the Charter/Accession 
to the ECHR” (the “Report”).2  A central issue in any reform process, in particular when 
it involves establishing a constitutional bill of rights, is identifying the objectives to be 
achieved by a particular constitutional provision: “When a legal norm is expressed as an 
article in an institutional framework, it is articulated in a particular manner for a 
particular purpose”.3  It is the contention of this article that a number of the 
recommendations of WG II failed to meet this standard and this failure was endorsed by 
the in extenso acceptance of the Report by the Convention on the Future of Europe (the 
“Convention”). 
 
A plethora of reform proposals have contributed to the proposed modifications to the 
existing system of protection of fundamental rights in the draft Constitution.4 The two 
                                                 
* Lecturer in Law at the Dublin Institute of Technology. This article was written in 2003. 
A condensed version of the article is published as: ‘Beware of lawyers bearing gifts: A 
critical evaluation of the Proposals on Fundamental Rights in the EU Constitutional 
Treaty.’ [2004] 4 European Human Rights Law Review, pp. 424-435. The author 
gratefully acknowledges comments on drafts of this article from Professor Javaid 
Rehman. The views expressed in this article are strictly personal to the author. 
 
1
 CONV 850/03. Available on the Convention website at http//:european-convention.eu.int. All documents 
referred to in this article available on this website are not further referenced. References to specific Articles 
in Part I, II or III of the draft Constitution omit reference to the draft Constitution.   
 
2
 CONV 354/02: WG II 16, Brussels, October 22, 2002.Available on the Convention website. For a 
detailed study on the Report see the Sixth Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords, The 
Future Status of The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Session 2002-2003. HL Paper 48. HMSO. 
 
3
 Teraya Koji, ‘Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond: From the Perspective of 
Non-derogable Rights’ (2001) 12 EJIL  917. 
 
4
 See, for example, the proposals for reform of P.Alston and J.H.H.Weiler, ‘An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in 
Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights’,  in P. Alston,  M. Bustelo and J. 
Heenan (eds.),  The EU and Human Rights (OUP, 1999) 3. The critical role of the European Parliament in 
providing impetus for change is analysed in the same volume  by R. Rack and S. Lausegger, ‘The Role of 
the European Parliament: Past and Future’, 801.  
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principal recommendations of WG II adopted by the Convention, the creation of a 
constitutional mandate for the Union to accede to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the “ECHR”)5 and 
incorporation of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union (the “Charter”) 
in the draft Constitution as a legally binding text,6 reflect the balance of political and 
academic opinion in favor of both initiatives.7   
 
However, WG II in general did not provide policy justification for the recommendations 
in the Report, justifying its technical and legal approach8 on the grounds of its limited 
terms of reference.9  This approach was, however, pursued selectively insofar as several 
recommendations in the Report were influenced by political pressure from the Member 
States and resulted in changes of substance, in particular as regards the Charter,10 while in 
other cases it was used to avoid addressing potentially beneficial reforms to fundamental 
rights protection in the Union. The suspicion that, notwithstanding WG II’s statement that 
the political decision on incorporation of the Charter and accession to the ECHR should 
be reserved to the Convention Plenary,11 the Report represented a ‘done deal’ was 
reinforced by the uncritical adoption by the Convention of the Report. The President of 
the Convention’s exhortation to the Member States not to amend the basis of the draft 
Constitution at the Intergovernmental Conference opened at Rome on October 4, 2003 
(the “IGC”),12 further lessened the likelihood of a substantial revision of the Report’s 
recommendations as incorporated in the draft Constitution by the IGC. 
                                                 
5
 In this article reference is made to accession to the ECHR. The question of which ECHR Protocols the 
Union would accede to is, as WG II points out at page 14 of the Report, for the Council to resolve at the 
time of accession. 
 
6
 On the legal effects of incorporation, see section 7 below.  
 
7
 Support is, however, not universal: ‘The Charter simply adds an unnecessary further tier which lacks the 
subtlety and flexibility of the current system of negotiation.’: R. Bellamy, ‘Constitutive Citizenship versus 
Constitutional Rights: Republican Reflections on the EU Charter and the Human Rights Act’, in T. 
Campbell, K.D.Ewing and A.Tomkins (eds.), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (OUP, 2001) 33.  See also 
J.H.H.Weiler, ‘Editorial: Does the European Union Truly Need a Charter of Rights?’ (2000) 6 ELJ 95-97. 
 
8
 For a valuable synthesis of the arguments against a technocratic view of the lawyer’s role see: 
J.H.H.Weiler and A.L.Paulus, ‘The Structure of Change in International Law or Is there a Hierarchy of 
Norms in International Law?’(1997) 8 EJIL 545. 
 
9
 The mandate of WG II is set out in CONV 72/02. Available on the Convention website. 
 
10
 The British Government made this explicit: ‘We and some other Member States worked hard in the 
Convention on the Future of Europe to help get more clarity and legal certainty into the Charter. The 
changes we helped pushed through have put the whole package in much better legal shape’. A 
Constitutional Treaty for the EU, The British Approach to the European Intergovernmental Conference 
2003, Cm5934 (September 2003), at para.101. 
 
11
 The Report, at 2 and 11. 
 
12
 The Rome Declaration of V.Giscard D’Estaing, President of the Convention, of  July 18, 2003 to the 
Italian Presidency. Available on the Convention website. 
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It is the aim of this article to evaluate the proposals of WG II incorporated into the draft 
Constitution by situating them in the context of issues of principle relating to the sources, 
scope and enforceability of fundamental rights in the Union. While this analysis lends 
strong support to incorporation of the Charter and accession by the Union to the ECHR, it 
concludes that a number of other provisions in the draft Constitution, and in particular the 
retention of general principles of law as a source of fundamental rights in the Union’s 
legal system and the amendments to the Charter to allay concerns of certain Member 
States over extensions to the Union’s competence in the field of fundamental rights, are 
not justified and merit further critical examination and debate during the IGC  process.  
 
1. Sources of fundamental rights in Union law: undue complexity? 
 
The sources of fundamental rights norms in Union law are exceptionally fluid as a result 
of the case by case development of protection by the European Court of Justice (Court of 
Justice): “The Court has consistently held that fundamental rights form an integral part of 
the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures…….. For that purpose, 
the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of 
human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are 
signatories. In that regard, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms …has particular significance”.13 The Court then specified 
that Article 6(2) TEU, which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and unmodified by 
either the Amsterdam or Nice Treaties, embodies that case-law.14  The Charter rights and 
principles, although not formally incorporated into the Union’s legal order, have become 
a further source of fundamental rights standards.15  
 
While WG II did not make a recommendation on the issue of retaining Article 6(2) TEU, 
the Convention incorporated in Article I-7(3) a clause with substantially similar wording 
whereby fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR and ‘as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles 
of the Union’s law’.16  The formulation in both Article 6(2) TEU and Article I-7(3) is 
narrower than the existing case law of the Court of Justice on the sources for general 
principles of Union law and raises the issue of whether the Court of Justice would 
interpret Article I-7(3) as restricting the sources of general principles of law to those 
                                                 
13
 Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski [2000] ECR 1-1935, at para. 25.  
 
14
 Ibid, at para. 27. 
 
15
 See J.Morijn, ‘Judicial References to the EU Fundamental Rights Charter’ at  
http://europe.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth000602_en.pdf. Accessed November 2003.  
 
16The reference in Article I-7(3) to Union law as opposed to Community law in Article 6(2) TEU does not 
constitute a substantive change. As S. Peers has argued the reference to Community law in Article 6(2) 
TEU is ‘vestigal’ and should be read as referring to Union law: ‘Human Rights and the Third Pillar’, in P. 
Alston, M. Bustelo and J. Heenan (eds.), op. cit., at 171. 
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specifically referenced.  It has been argued, on the basis of Advocate-General Jacob’s 
reference to the First Protocol to the ECHR in Bosphorous,17 that Article 6(2) TEU 
should not be interpreted in this restrictive sense;18 however, such an argument would be 
less persuasive in the context of a constitutional text. The existing principle established 
by the Court of Justice that international human rights treaties other than the ECHR may 
be used as an interpretative tool in determining the general principles of fundamental 
rights law applied by the Court of Justice would, however, remain applicable.19   
The current proposals set out in the draft Constitution would further complicate the 
overlapping steams of fundamental rights norms flowing into the Union’s legal order. In 
general, the establishment of a hierarchy of norms in the field of fundamental rights has 
been opposed on the basis that prioritizing certain rights at the expense of others would 
threaten the indivisibility of human rights.20 But if an approach based on differential 
standards of human rights protection is to be rejected,21 the question of the ordering of 
fundamental rights norms originating from these various sources requires resolution. A 
constitutional ordering of these potentially competing norms would enhance the 
democratic legitimacy of any such resolution. 
 
The draft Constitution does establish, albeit in disparate provisions, an ordering of 
fundamental rights within the Union’s legal system according to their source. As regards 
rights derived from international law, Article I-3(4) commits the Union to “strict 
observance and development of international law, including respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter”. This provision reflects the existing case law of the Court of 
Justice to the effect that public international law forms part of the Union’s public legal 
order and that the Union is obliged to respect international law in the exercise of its 
powers.22  Article II-53, which is on the same terms as Article 53 of the Charter, provides  
specific constitutional authority for the primacy of international law over Charter rights 
and principles in the event the latter provide a lesser standard of protection: “Nothing in 
this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as recognized, in their respective fields of application, by Union 
                                                 
17
 Case C-84/95, Bosphorous v. Minister for Transport [1996] ECR I-3953. 
 
18
 S.Peers,  op. cit., at 174. 
 
19
 See S.Piers, op. cit., at 171, n.27. 
 
20
 See  G. Schwarzenberger, ‘International jus cogens?,’ (1965) 43 Texas Law Review 455;  P. Weil, 
‘Towards Relative Normativity in International law?’ (1983) 77 AJIL 413; and T. Meron, ‘On a Hierarchy 
of International Human Rights’ (1986) 80 AJIL 1. However, recent academic opinion has been more 
favourable to an ordering of fundamental rights, arguing for example that  non-derogable rights can form 
the basis of understanding hierarchy in international law: see T. Koji, op. cit.; and J.Tasioulas, ‘In Defence 
of Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case’ (1996) 16 OJLS 85;   but see the 
critique of Tasioulas’ position  by J. Beckett, ‘Behind Relative Normativity: Rules and Process as 
Prerequisites of Law’ (2001) 12 EJIL 627. 
 
21
 See section 3 below. 
 
22
 R.Higgins, ‘The ICJ, the ECJ and the Integrity of International Law’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 1. 
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law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the 
Member States are party, including the ECHR, and by the Member States’ constitutions”.  
 
The principle established by Article II-53 is subject, insofar as concerns Charter rights 
corresponding to ECHR rights, to Article II-52(3) which provides that the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the ECHR but without 
preventing “Union law providing more extensive protection”. A difficult, but probably 
academic,23 question would arise if a ruling of the Court of Human Rights were to 
conflict with international law. If the relevant provision of the ECHR corresponded to a 
Charter right then Article I-3(4) and Article II-52(3) could conflict, although the Court of 
Justice would no doubt strive to interpret the international law norm as providing more 
extensive protection so as to avoid such a conflict. If the ECHR provision did not 
correspond to a Charter right and formed part of Union law either through accession by 
the Union to the ECHR or as a general principle of Union law under Article I-7(3), then 
the international law norm should prevail in case of conflict by reason of Article I-3(4).24 
 
Finally there is the issue of ordering the sources of general principles of law specified in 
Article I-7(3).25 Clearly no such general principle would be admitted by the Court of 
Justice insofar as it conflicted with international law and that is confirmed by Article I-
3(4). Further, as regards general principles resulting from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, no such tradition should be admitted as a general 
principle insofar as it conflicts with the ECHR or the Charter since the recognition of any 
such conflicting principle in the case of the Charter would be a violation of Article I-7(1) 
and in the case of the ECHR would be incompatible both with the mandate for the Union 
to accede to the ECHR under Article I-7(2) and the ECHR as a source of fundamental 
rights under the general principles case law. Accession by the Union to the ECHR would, 
of course, in addition make the adoption of such a tradition in conflict with the ECHR a 
breach of the Union’s obligations under international law. The implausibility of these 
scenarios provides support for the argument that retention of general principles as a 
source of law under Article I-7(3) is unnecessary and confusing.26 
 
 
2.  A ‘Lawyer’s Paradise’? : Union Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law  
                                                 
23
 ‘Its [the Court of Human Rights] starting point is that human rights law, including the Convention on 
Human Rights, is part of international law.’ R.Higgins, ibid, at 10.  
 
24
 ‘One may therefore conclude – tentatively – that an international agreement entered into by the 
Community will be of no effect within the Community legal system if it is outside the capacity of the 
Community or if it conflicts with one of the constituent Treaties or (possibly) with a general principle of 
law’: T.C.Hartley, op. cit., at 185-186.  
 
25
 On the hierarchical relationship between general principles and the Community Treaties see T. Kyriakou, 
‘The impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on the EU system of protection of rights: much ado 
about nothing?’ (2001) 5 Web JCLI: http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2001/issue5/kyriakou5.html.  Accessed 
November 2003. 
 
26
 See section 2 below. 
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‘The dominant way of safeguarding fundamental rights is the rule of law’.27 The rule of 
law is an integral part of fundamental rights protection and recognition of the rule of law 
is embedded in the principal international conventions for the protection of fundamental 
rights recognized by the Court of Justice as sources for the general principles of Union 
law.28  In Golder the Court of Human Rights emphasized the importance of references to 
the rule of law in the Statute of the Council of Europe and the ECHR as an interpretative 
aid to the substantive rights conferred by the ECHR:  
“It may also be accepted, as the Government have submitted, that 
the Preamble does not include the rule of law in the object and 
purpose of the Convention, but points to it as being one of the 
features of the common spiritual heritage of the member States of 
the Council of Europe. The Court however considers, like the 
Commission, that it would be a mistake to see in this reference a 
merely “more or less rhetorical reference”, devoid of relevance for 
those interpreting the Convention. One reason why the signatory 
Governments decided to “take the first steps for the collective 
enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal 
Declaration” was their profound belief in the rule of law”.29 
The Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (“TEC”) likewise affirm the importance of respecting the rule of law.30 
Recital two of the Preamble to the Charter also refers to the rule of law and the 
substantive Articles of the Charter enshrine a number of the basic rights constituting both 
the formal and substantive elements of the rule of law. The draft Constitution 
consolidates these provisions in Article I-2: “The Union is founded on the values of 
respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights. These values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination”. Article I-58, incorporating 
provisions relating to suspension of membership rights, retains the reference to “a clear 
risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values mentioned in Article I-2” as the 
trigger for sanctions. Article I-56 refers to the values of the Union as the basis for 
                                                 
27
 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights and the 
Core of the European Union’ (2000) 37 CMLRev. 1307, at 1311-1312.  For a useful survey of legal 
scholarship relating to the rule of law see: David Dyzenhaus, ‘Recrafting the Rule of Law’, in David 
Dyzenhaus (ed.) Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (Hart Publishing, 1999) 1. 
 
28
 See, for example, Articles 6 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 16 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ‘ICCPR’). 
 
29
 Golder v United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR 524, at para. 34.  
 
30
 Third preamble of the TEU and Articles 6(1) TEU and 7 TEU. Article 177 TEC refers to ‘developing and 
consolidating’ the rule of law in Community development co-operation policies and Article 220 TEC 
provides: ‘The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law 
is observed’. For an analysis of the role played by Article 220 TEC in the relationship between the rule of 
law and fundamental rights developed by the Court of Justice as general principles see: T.Kyriakou, op. cit. 
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developing a special relationship with neighboring states.  The incorporation of the 
Charter by Article I–7(1) and the mandate for the Union under Article I-7(2) to seek 
accession to the ECHR would strengthen the link between protection of fundamental 
rights and the rule of law in the Union’s new constitution. 
 
Notwithstanding the clear connection established by international human rights treaties 
between respect for human rights and the rule of law, the relationship between the two 
principles has been problematic in the context of Union law.  Firstly, protection of 
fundamental rights was developed by the Court of Justice on the basis of general 
principles of law rather than on the basis of a constitutional bill of rights.31 As such the 
principles originally depended for their legitimacy on the integrity of the judicial process 
rather than democratic validation .  Secondly, the Charter sets itself out as recognizing 
rather than creating the ‘rights, freedoms and principles’ set out in the Charter and is not 
as yet integrated into the Union’s legal order.32  Nevertheless, Advocates-General and the 
Court of First Instance have referred to the Charter as an authoritative statement of 
human rights standards applicable in Union law33 which raises the issue of whether such 
judicial activism is consistent with the principles of the rule of law.34  Thirdly, Title IV of 
the TEC and Title VI of the TEU, which contain provisions establishing a “common area 
of freedom, security and justice”,  provide more limited access to democratic control and 
judicial review of Community measures than in other areas of Community law.35   
 
The tension between the role of the judiciary and the legislature in the field of 
fundamental rights reflects the more general problem of democratic legitimacy in the 
Union. In a political structure where human rights are constitutionalised, encroachment of 
judicial powers is restricted but in the case of the Union the lack of an original 
constitutional basis for human rights protection allowed scope for judicial expansionism 
both as regards the delimitation of powers between the community institutions and 
between the Community and the Member States raising issues of compatibility with the 
rule of law both as a substantive and procedural doctrine.36  Two views on the application 
                                                 
31
 See for a summary of the development of the Court of Justice’s role: Bruno De Witte, ‘The Past and 
Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights’, in P. Alston, M. Bustelo 
and J. Heenan (eds), op. cit., 859. 
 
32
 For an appraisal of the normative status of the Charter see: C.Engel, ‘The European Charter of Human 
Rights: A Changed Political Opportunity Structure and its Normative Consequences’ (2001) 7 ELJ 151. 
 
33
 See J.Morijn, op. cit. 
 
34
 See for a summary of the position of ‘democratic positivists’ who contest the role of the judiciary in 
developing rules of law and ‘liberal anti-positivists’ who support such a role: D. Dzyenhaus, op. cit., at 2-3.  
 
35
 See for a comprehensive review of this area: S. Peers: ‘Human Rights and the Third Pillar’, in P. Alston, 
M. Bustelo and J. Heenan (eds.), op. cit.,  167; and S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs (Pearson, 2000). 
 
36
 See P.Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ 
(1997) Public Law 467. For a discussion of the arguments about ‘majoritarian democracy’ as the preferred 
system of protecting the rule of law see: J. Goldsworthy, ‘Legislative Sovereignty and the Rule of Law’ in 
T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing, and A. Tomkins (eds), op. cit., 61. 
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of the rule of law to the European Union have been identified:37 “pro-ECJ scholars” who 
concluded that “the traditional characteristics of the rule of law are preserved at the E.U. 
level: along the lines of the traditional Rechsstaat, independence from other institutional 
actors and consistency of adjudication obtains throughout the system” and “juro-sceptics” 
who argue “that a rule of law other than one confined exclusively to economic integration 
is unlikely to emerge in the near future” on the basis that the Court of Justice “lacks the 
necessary autonomy to keep the other political institutions from enacting arbitrary and 
inconsistent policies”.38  
 
The provisions of the draft Constitution incorporated on the basis of the 
recommendations made by WG II significantly alter the terms of debate over the 
relationship between fundamental rights protection and the rule of law in the Union. 
Incorporation of the Charter and Union accession to the ECHR would provide the Union 
with a clearly defined constitutional basis for the protection of fundamental rights. In 
particular, accession to the ECHR would weaken the argument that the rule of law does 
not apply fully to the Union on the basis of a lack of autonomy on the part of the Court of 
Justice.39  However, Article I-7(3) and Articles II-52(4) and 52(5) would undermine these 
benefits from a rule of law perspective.  
 
Article I-7(3),  a modified version of  Article 6(2) TEU, substitutes for the obligation for 
the Union to “respect” as general principles of “Community”  law  fundamental rights as 
guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, the stipulation that such rights shall “constitute” general principles 
“of the Union’s law”. The retention of the reference to the common constitutional 
traditions and the ECHR as sources of general principles of law in Article I-7(3) seems 
designed to retain a dynamic element to the protection of fundamental rights in Union 
law. 40  However, the Court of Justice’s references to such common constitutional 
traditions have been perfunctory: “One could even say that the Court of Justice is not 
genuinely interested in finding out whether there is a ‘common tradition’ among the 
Member States concerning the legal regime of a particular rule. References to specific 
national legal systems are perfunctory and haphazard. A national constitutional judgment 
has never been cited”.41  Accession of the new Member States will further complicate 
                                                 
37
 J. P. McCormick, ‘Supranational Challenges to the Rule of Law: The Case of the European Union’ in 
David Dyzenhaus (ed.), op. cit., 267. 
 
38
 Ibid, at 280-281. 
 
39
 WG II in its Report concentrated on a different aspect of autonomy, namely whether accession of the 
Union to the ECHR would impact adversely ‘on the principle of autonomy of Community (or Union) law 
including the position and authority of the European Court of Justice’ (p.12). As discussed in section 6 
below their views on this issue seem misguided. 
 
40
 While Working Party II made no recommendation on retention, those members in favour argued that 
such a reference ‘could serve to complete the protection offered by the Charter and clarify that Union law is 
open for future evolutions in ECHR and Member States’ human rights law’: the Report, at 9. 
 
41
 Bruno de Witte, op. cit., at 878. 
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reliance on such traditions.  Furthermore, the reference to the ECHR is otiose since, even 
if accession negotiations to the ECHR were to fail, the Charter already substantially 
recognises the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR.42  WG II emphasized that 
Article 52(3) of the Charter, incorporated unamended as Article II-52(3), means that if 
Charter rights correspond to ECHR rights they shall have the same scope and meaning as 
laid down in the ECHR but that,  according to the second sentence of Article 52(3), this 
does not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection than the ECHR if Union 
legislation subsequently so provides or provisions of the Charter, although based on the 
ECHR, provided more extensive protection.43 In the light of the minimum standard of 
protection guaranteed by Article II-52(3), even if the Union does not accede to the 
ECHR, it is difficult to see how retaining ECHR rights as a source of general principles 
of Union law could materially add to the same, or enhanced, rights set out in the Charter. 
 
One argument in favour of retaining Article I-7(3) is that the general principles derived 
from the ECHR could be used by the Court of Justice to recognize rights not protected 
under the Charter but protected under the ECHR on the basis of Article II-53. Such a 
lacuna might develop as a result of divergent case law between the Court of Justice and 
the Court of Human Rights.44 However, this is rather an argument in favour of the 
Union’s accession to the ECHR if the Charter is incorporated. Incorporation of the 
Charter will increase the risk of such divergence since “experience tends to show that it is 
difficult to avoid contradictions where two differently worded texts on the same subject-
matter are interpreted by two different courts” and the “provisions of Article 52 and 53 of 
the EU Charter will probably not be sufficient to avoid the risk of contradictions, 
certainly not where the application and interpretation of the Charter and the ECHR by 
national courts is concerned”.45  Another argument for retaining I-7(3),  that “the scope of 
application ratione materiae of the Charter is more limited than the protection offered by 
the present system of guaranteeing respect of fundamental rights in the EU flowing from 
Article 6(2) juncto Article 46(d) EU”,46 would lose much of its persuasiveness following 
incorporation of the Charter into the Union’s Constitution.  If the Charter is incorporated, 
the inclusion of Article I-7(3) should therefore be rejected as undermining certainty in 
                                                 
42
 ‘It means that, by and large, the substantive provisions of the European Convention have been 
incorporated [in the Charter], although not exactly in the same wording’: L. Betten, Human Rights, (2001) 
50 ICLQ  690, at 692.  
 
43
 The Report, at 7. WG II refers to Articles 47 and 50 of the Charter as examples of provisions providing 
more extensive protection. 
 
44
 It seems unlikely that the Court of Justice would interpret the Charter so as to give rise to such conflicts, 
although the timing of judgments on similar issues might give rise to inadvertent conflicts.  
 
45
 Study of Technical and Legal Issues of a Possible EC/EU Accession to the ECHR dated  September 28, 
2002 by the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) of the Council of Europe (the CDDH Report),  
reproduced in WD No 8 of WG II, at 26-27. Available on the Convention website. 
 
46
 K.Lenaerts and E.E. de Smijter, ‘A “Bill of Rights” for the European Union’ (2001) 38 CMLR 273, at 
281. 
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identification of the Union’s fundamental rights.47 Accession by the Union to 
international treaties protecting fundamental rights in addition to the ECHR would 
provide a preferable method of improving the protection available under the Charter and 
the ECHR to the retention of general principles under Article I-7(3).48 
 
Secondly, Article II-52(4) provides: ‘Insofar as this Charter recognizes fundamental 
rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
those rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions’. WG II, with two 
members dissenting, justified Article II-52(4) on the basis it served to emphasize the 
“firm roots” of the Charter in the common constitutional traditions of the Member States 
and “in the interest of smooth incorporation of the Charter as a legally binding 
document”.49  This argument suggests the purpose of inserting Article II-52(4) was 
political expediency rather than an objective analysis of its merits. Apart from the 
difficulty of identifying such traditions, such a rule of interpretation if applied literally 
risks freezing the interpretation of the Charter articles concerned to reflect the 
constitutional traditions of the current Member States.  
 
WG II then sets out how it considers Article II-52(4) should be applied: “the Charter 
rights concerned should be interpreted in a way offering a high standard of protection 
which is adequate for the law of the Union and in harmony with the common 
constitutional traditions”. This contradictory terminology apparently reflects academic 
arguments in favour of the application of differential standards of human rights,50 
although the Report claims to reject the argument that the Court of Justice should adopt a 
“lowest common denominator” approach to Charter rights derived from the common 
constitutional traditions.51  However, the reference to an interpretation “in harmony with 
those traditions” is so vague that it is hard to see how the Court of Justice could give it 
any substantive effect. In practice, the Court of Justice is more likely discreetly to ignore 
the provision as political rhetoric. A further objection to Article II-52(4) is that since the 
Charter does not, with good cause, explicitly identify the rights derived from the common 
constitutional traditions nor which traditions form the source of such rights, one is 
                                                 
47
 The WG II discussion paper dated June 18, 2002 sets out admirably the objections to retaining an 
equivalent to Article 6(2) TEU (CONV 116/02), at 10; available on the Convention website. See also 
C.Engel’s recommendation to eliminate Article 6(2) TEU if the Charter were incorporated ‘lest the 
Community create a ‘lawyers paradise’ on fundamental rights’, op. cit., at 167. 
 
48
 For a discussion of options for enhancing protection of human rights under Community law see: G.Gaja, 
‘New Instruments and Institutions for Enhancing the Protection of Human Rights in Europe?’ in P.Alston, 
M.Bustelo and J.Heenan (eds.), op. cit., at 796-800. It has been argued the Community could, without a 
Treaty amendment, currently accede to the European Social Charter, the Convention of the Council of 
Europe on Data Protection and the Vienna Convention on Human Rights and Application of Biology and 
Medicine: P.Alston and J.H.H.Weiler, op. cit., at 31.  See further J.H.H.Weiler and S.C. Fries, ‘EC & EU 
Competences in Human Rights’, in P. Alston, M. Bustelo and J. Heenan (eds.), op. cit., 147. 
 
49
 The Report, at 7. 
 
50
 See section 3 below. 
 
51
 The Report, at 7. 
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obliged to refer to the “Explanations” to the Charter (the Explanations),52 which 
requirement weakens the authority of the Charter and risks solidifying the rights 
protected by it. As has been aptly stated: “Good constitutions are short and enigmatic”.53 
 
WG II also proposed, with two members having reservations, a new provision which has 
been inserted as Article II-52(5): “The provisions of this Charter which contain principles 
may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by the institutions and bodies 
of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in 
the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognizable only in the 
interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality”. According to WG II Article 
II-52(5) would be “consistent both with the case-law of the Court of Justice and with the 
approach of the Member States’ constitutional systems to ‘principles’ particularly in the 
field of social law”.54  It provided reassurance that “future jurisprudence” will be able to 
rule on the ‘exact attribution of articles to the two categories” (right or principle) by 
referring to the wording of the respective articles of the Charter “taking into account the 
important guidance provided by the Explanations, supplemented by explanations from 
the current Working Group”.55  
 
Several criticisms may be made of Article II-52(5). Firstly, it constitutes an attribution of 
legislative competence, although it fails to define the modalities of its exercise, which is 
out of place in a constitutional rights instrument such as the Charter and conflicts with 
Article II-51(2), which is an amended version of Article 51(2) of the Charter,56 since it 
establishes a new legislative power for the Union. Secondly, by restricting judicial 
cognizance of Charter principles to implementing legislation it deprives the principles of 
legal effect in the absence of such legislation. Since many of the principles are of a 
general nature and relate to areas where community action is likely to be dilatory, this 
would risk relegating the principles to the fate of many Christmas poinsettias: left to 
wither after due credit has been taken for their initial bloom.  Thirdly, it creates a rigid 
distinction between the legal effect of those provisions of the Charter recognizing rights 
and those containing principles, whereas Article 51(1) of the Charter simply provides the 
Member Sates shall “respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the 
application thereof in accordance with their respective powers”. Article II-52(5) therefore 
constitutes a substantive change to the structure of the Charter the recommendation of 
which fell outside the scope of WG II’s competence and does not correspond to the 
‘technical drafting adjustments’ which it was at pains to stress was the limit of its remit.57   
                                                 
52
 Contained in document CHARTE 4473/00 CONVENT 49 of October 11, 2000. Available on the 
Convention website. 
 
53
 C.Engel, op. cit., at 151.  
 
54
 The Report, at 8.  
 
55
 The Report, at 8. 
 
56
 See further section 3 below. 
 
57
 The Report, at 4-5. 
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Finally, WG II  emphasized the importance of the Explanations as an important tool in 
ensuring a “correct understanding of the Charter” and proposed the explanations 
contained in their report should be “fully integrated with the original Explanations”.58   
This suggestion was in part adopted by the Convention through an addition to the 
Preamble to the Charter set out in Part Two of the draft Constitution: “In this context the 
Charter will be interpreted by the courts of the Union and the Member States with due 
regard to the explanations prepared at the instigation of the Praesidium of the Convention 
which drafted the Charter”. However, the Explanations were formulated on the basis they 
should have “no legal value”59 and a change to their status would undermine the 
transparency and accessibility of fundamental rights in the new constitution and 
jeopardize a dynamic interpretation of the Charter rights and principles by the Court of 
Justice.60 The analysis of Article 53 of the Charter in the Explanations demonstrates the 
danger of according them legal status (emphasis added): ‘This provision is intended to 
maintain the level of protection currently afforded within their respective scope by 
Union law, national law and international law.’61 Such an interpretation would 
unnecessarily exclude from the scope of Article II-53 future conventions protecting 
fundamental rights to which the Union acceded. 
 
3. Incorporation of the Charter and the relationship between National and Union 
Law 
 
Human rights norms can have either an integrating or destabilizing effect on the 
relationship between the Union’s legal order and the national legal orders of the Member 
States.62 The initial impetus for the development by the Court of Justice of human rights 
norms within the community legal system was provided by the decisions of the 
constitutional courts of Germany and Italy challenging the legitimacy of the principle of 
supremacy of community law developed by the Court of Justice in the absence of such 
norms.63  In this context the development of human rights norms had an integrating 
function. However, the extension by the Court of Justice of the application of these norms 
to actions by the Member States both in implementing Community law (Wachauf64) and 
                                                 
58
 Ibid, at 10. The British Government endorsed this proposal, op. cit., at para.102.   
 
59
 See the Explanations, op. cit., at 1. 
 
60
 On the requirement for transparency and clarity in the Union’s instruments and procedures, see the Final 
Report of Working Group IX, CONV 424/02, Brussels November 29, 2002. Available on the Convention 
website. 
 
61
 The Explanations, op. cit., at 50. 
 
62
 See on the integrating effect of the Charter: C.Engel, op. cit., at 154.  
 
63
 See Bruno de Witte, op. cit. 
 
64
 Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Germany [1989] ECR 2609. 
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in derogating from the application of Community law (ERT65) created the potential for 
conflicts between the requirements of national constitutionally protected rights and those 
developed by the Court of Justice.66  This has led some commentators to argue that 
different standards should be applied by the Court of Justice to the protection of human 
rights for Community measures from those measures adopted by the Member States in 
derogation of their Community obligations in order to protect the Member State’s margin 
of appreciation in such situations.67  
 
The proclamation of the Charter outside the legislative framework of the Treaties 
reflected the tensions between conflicting national and Union perceptions as to the role of 
human rights norms in the Union legal order. Concerns over incorporation of the Charter 
relate both to extension of Union competence through the back-door of human rights 
protection and also the relationship between the Charter provisions and national human 
rights standards.68 The ‘horizontal’ provisions of the Charter, and in particular Articles 
51(1) and (2) and Article 53, were designed to limit the potential for such conflicts.69  
WG II recommended drafting amendments to Articles 51(1) and (2) and additional  
‘horizontal’ provisions in Articles II-52(4), (5) and (6) and these were adopted verbatim 
in the draft Constitution.70 Despite the Working Group’s claim that these are  “technical 
drafting adjustments”,71 an analysis of the changes shows they are potentially substantive 
in nature72 and reflect the overriding concern of WG II to ensure that “incorporation of 
                                                 
65
 Case C-260/89, ERT v DEP [1991] ECR 1-2925. 
 
66
 An example of such conflict occurred in Case C-285/98,  Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2000] 
ECR 1-0069.  For analysis of the case see J. Schwarze, op. cit., at 28-29. SPUC v. Grogan is an example of 
a case where the Court of Justice avoided having to resolve such a conflict: Case C-159/90 [1991] ECR 
4685. 
 
67
 J.H.H.Weiler, ‘Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On Standards and Values in the 
Protection of Human Rights’ in  N.A. Neuwahl and A. Osas (eds.) The European Union and Human Rights  
(Kluwer, 1995) 51.  But see also L.Besselink: ‘Entrapped by the Maximum Standard: On Fundamental 
Rights, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the European Union’ (1998) 35 CMLRev. 629. See also Armin de 
Bogdandy’s arguments in favor of differential human rights standard to be applied by the Union in the field 
of foreign relations, national measures implementing Union law, and acts of the Union’s institutions, op. 
cit., at 1318-1319. 
 
68
 See generally P.Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question’ (2002) 39 
CMLRev. 945; and J.Bering, ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of 
Community Law?’; LLM dissertation, Liisberg,  NYU School of Law at: 
http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010401.html; accessed   November 2003.  
 
69
 On Article 51 see the detailed analysis by P. Eeckhout, op. cit. 
                                                    
70
 The proposed ‘drafting adjustments’ are set out in the Annex to the Report.  
 
71
 The Report, at 4. 
 
72
 See section 2 above for an analysis of Articles II-52(4) and (5). 
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the Charter will in no way modify the allocation of competences between the Union and 
the Member States”.73   
 
Article 51(1) of the Charter is modified in Article II-51(1) by the addition of “agencies” 
to “institutions” and “bodies” of the Union as addressees of the provisions of the 
Charter74 and the insertion at the end of  the second sentence of the phrase  “and 
respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it by the other Parts 
of the Constitution”.  Article 51(2) is amended in Article II-51(2) as highlighted to read: 
“This Charter does not extend the scope of application of Union law beyond the 
powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify 
powers and tasks defined in the other Parts of the Constitution”. The reasons which 
led WG II to recommend these modifications emphasizing the jurisdictional boundaries 
of the Charter are difficult to discern from the Report,75 or indeed why the Convention 
should have adopted the proposals verbatim. The Report acknowledges that the existing 
text of Article 51(2) of the Charter addresses the issue of allocation of competences 
between the Union and the Member States.76 The underlying rationale, as part of the 
strategy of making incorporation more palatable to wavering Member States,77 seems to 
have been to reinforce a restrictive interpretation of the scope of the Charter as 
constituting a record of existing human rights protection under Union law rather than an 
interpretation of the Charter as a dynamic contribution to “strengthening EU fundamental 
rights protection”.78  
 
However, the first sentence from Article 51(1) of the Charter is retained unamended in 
Article II-51(1), whereby the Charter provisions are addressed to the Member States 
“only when they are implementing Union law”. WG II specifically endorsed this 
provision by reference to the principle of subsidiarity,79 although this utilitarian test as set 
out in Article I-9(3) hardly seems relevant to the issue of the scope of the Court of 
Justice’s judicial review powers over violations of Charter rights.  The Charter will 
therefore not apply to the exercise of derogations by the Member States from their 
                                                 
73
 The Report, at 5.  
 
74
 This amendment was not proposed  by WG II.  
 
75
 The Report does refer in support of the amendment to Article 51(2) of the Charter to the established case 
law of the Court of Justice and in particular Case C-249/96, Grant v. South West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-
621. However, it seems unnecessary for the Charter to be amended to confirm case law of the Court of 
Justice.   
 
76
 The Report, at 5. 
 
77
 The reference with approval to the amended text of Article 51(2) by the British Government indicates the 
political pressure exerted on WG II in this area,  op.cit., at para. 102.   
 
78
 P.Eeckhout,  op.cit., at 981. 
 
79
 The Report, at 5. 
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obligations under Union law,80 unless the Court of Justice were to adopt a strained 
interpretation of Article II-51(1) to bring it into line with its general principles case law.81  
An alternative route for the Court of Justice would be to bypass the limitation under 
Article II-51(1) by continuing to apply the wider criteria developed in its general 
principles case law on the basis of Article I-7(3). Such an approach, however, would 
create an unfortunate dichotomy between the scope of protection for Charter rights and 
Article I-7(3) protected rights. 
 
Following the recommendation of WG II, a new Article II-52(6) provides: “Full account 
shall be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter”. The Report 
justifies this new provision by reference to the principle of subsidiarity referred to in the 
Preamble and Article 51(1) of the Charter and ‘from those Charter Articles which make 
references to national laws and practices’.82 Again it is difficult to attribute any specific 
meaning to this provision. Firstly, the principle of subsidiarity was relevant to 
determining the original scope of the Charter, as made clear in Article 51(1) of the 
Charter,  but not to the interpretation of the Charter provisions, whether or not referring 
to national laws and practices. Secondly, on each occasion the Charter refers to national 
laws and practices it is clear from the relevant Article that the exercise of the right shall 
be determined in accordance with such national laws and practices and therefore Article 
II-52(6) adds nothing to the Charter’s existing text; as indeed Article II-52(6) recognises 
by providing that full account shall be taken of national laws and practices “as specified 
in the Charter”. 
 
In conclusion, the Report contributed little of substance to the debate over the boundaries 
between Union protection of fundamental rights and national constitutional protection. 
The proposals made, and adopted verbatim by the Convention, were of a conservative 
nature designed to assuage the concerns of Member States opposed to incorporation of 
the Charter. It is, however, doubtful if the changes to Articles 51(1) and (2) of the Charter 
and the new provisions incorporated in Article II-52(4), (5), and (6)  will in fact be 
interpreted by the Court of Justice as altering the existing allocation of competences 
under the Charter.  
 
4. The control of derogations from fundamental rights in the Union’s legal order 
 
                                                 
80
 The Report, at p.5 (n.2), states: ‘It should be noted that, upon possible incorporation of the Charter into 
the Treaty, the current wording of Article 46 (d) TEU would have to be brought in line with existing case 
law and Article 51 of the Charter on the (limited) application of fundamental rights to acts of Member 
States’. This avoids the issue of the conflict between the existing case law on the scope of the Member 
States obligations to comply with the Union’s fundamental rights norms when derogating from Union law, 
discussed further at section 4 below, and Article 51(1). 
 
81
 For the reported view of the Bar European Group and Professor Arnull that such an interpretation is 
unlikely, see the House of Lords Select Committee Sixth Report, op. cit., at para. 60. 
 
82
 The Report, at 5. 
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The history of Nazi Germany, Vichy France and apartheid South Africa83 exemplify the 
dangers of a failure of judicial integrity in countering attempts to circumvent 
constitutional protection of fundamental rights by the expedient of derogations84 based on 
concepts such as  ‘public emergency’, ‘terrorism’ or ‘state security’. The responses of 
governments to the events of September 11, 2001 have highlighted the contemporary 
need for vigilance in times of public emergency.85 Although the Union currently lacks 
some of the key characteristics of a sovereign state, notably an autonomous military 
capability, police force, or security service,86 and has not developed a coherent legal 
framework for regulating the use of derogations from fundamental rights protection in 
emergency situations, as its powers are extended into areas prone to generate conflicts 
with fundamental rights, in particular relating to the “area of freedom, security and 
justice” established by Title VI of the TEU and Title IV of the TEC,87  the development 
of such a framework is pressing. In this section, the sources and control of the use of 
derogations under Union law will be examined in the context of the proposals in the draft 
Constitution.  
 
The principal international human rights treaties provide for derogations88 but only from 
non-core rights, which vary from treaty to treaty.  However, even in respect of derogable 
rights international treaties have been interpreted to restrict the freedom of states in the 
                                                 
83
 See M. Stolleis, The Law under the Swastika: Studies on Legal History in Nazi Germany, trans. by 
Thomas Dunlap (University of Chicago Press, 1998); R. H. Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in 
France (New York University Press, 1996); R.Abel, Politics by other Means: Law in the Struggle Against 
Apartheid, 1980-1994 (Routledge, 1995); and the contributions in Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits 
of Legal Order D.Dyzenhaus (ed.), op. cit. 
 
84
 Derogations, depending on the context, refer here both to formal derogation from fundamental rights 
obligations, as for example under Article 15 of the ECHR, and to restrictions and limitations on 
fundamental rights resulting from legislative provision or judicial interpretation.  
 
85
 See A.Cassese, ‘Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Categories of International Law’ (2001) 12 
EJIL 1993; E.Katselli and S.Shah, ‘September 11 and the UK Response’ (2003) 52 ICLQ  245; S.Peers, 
‘EU Responses to Terrorism’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 227; and C.Warbrick, ‘The Principles of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and the Responses of States to Terrorism’ (2002) 3 EHRLR  287. 
 
86
 But see the proposals for enabling an expansion of the role of Europol and Eurojust in the final report of 
Working Group X “Freedom, Security and Justice” (CONV 426/02);  available on the Convention website. 
87For the proposed extension of Union competence in this area, see the Final Report of Working Group X, 
op. cit Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Union adopted, inter alia, a Council Framework 
Decision on combating terrorism of 13 June 2002 (OJ 2002 L 164/3) and a Council Framework Decision of 
13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant (OJ 2002 L 190/1). On the Framework Decision on 
terrorism, see S.Peers, op. cit., and on the European arrest warrant, see ‘Memo on the European Arrest 
warrant as part of a move towards an area of freedom, security and justice in the EU’, a JUSTICE briefing, 
January 2002 at: http:///www.justice.org.uk/ourwork/eu/index.html. Accessed November 2003. 
 
88
 For example, Articles 4(1) and (2) of the ICCPR; Articles 27(1) and (2) of the American Convention of 
Human Rights (ACHR); and Articles 15(1) and (2) of the ECHR. See generally,J. Fitzpatrick: ‘Protection 
against Abuse of the concept of “Emergency”’ in L. Henkin and J.Lawrence (eds.) Human Rights: An 
Agenda for the Next Century ’ (Hargrove, 1993). 
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exercise of such derogations.89 As regards derogations from fundamental rights under 
Union law, three situations will need to be distinguished if the proposals in the draft 
Constitution on fundamental rights are adopted: firstly, derogations which form part of 
the Union’s general principles of law as they apply either to the institutions of the Union 
or to the Member States implementing or derogating from their obligations under Union 
law; secondly, derogations from Charter rights which may be broadly sub-divided into 
rights which result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
rights which correspond to ECHR rights, and rights which are based on the EC Treaty or 
the EU Treaty;90 and thirdly,  the specific case of the terms on which the Union could 
avail of the derogations provisions  under Article 15 of the ECHR. 
 
In respect of the first instance, the Court of Justice has established that fundamental rights 
derived from the common constitutional traditions apply to the acts of the institutions and 
the Member States but that the rights are subject to limitations: “Within the Community 
legal order it likewise seems legitimate that these rights should, if necessary, be subject to 
certain limits justified by the overall objectives pursued by the Community, on condition 
that the substance of these rights is left untouched”.91 In respect of fundamental rights 
derived from the ECHR, and capable of being subject to restriction, the Court of Justice 
has applied a similar test.92  As regards the scope of its jurisdiction to review derogations 
by a Member State from its obligations under the Treaties, the Court of Justice initially 
held that it had no power to control the conformity of national law with general principles 
of Union law, including fundamental rights, which falls outside the scope of Union law.93 
In subsequent case law, however, the Court of Justice has narrowed the scope of those 
judgments by holding that when a Member State seeks to justify a restriction on a 
fundamental freedom under the Treaties by relying on a derogation provision of the 
Treaties, that justification would be reviewed for its compatibility with the general 
principles of Union law, including fundamental rights.94    
                                                 
89
 For example see  Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1987) 11 EHRR 
33 on the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in times of emergency. It has been argued that one 
conclusion to be drawn from this Opinion is that ‘no European state should be permitted to derogate from 
its duties under Article 5(4) of the European Convention, even though this is not expressly excluded by 
Article 15(2)’: M. Janis, R. Kay and A. Bradley, European Human Rights Law, 2nd Edition (OUP, 2000) at 
401. In respect of derogations under Article 15(2) of the ECHR, see Brannigan and McBride v. United 
Kingdom [1993] 17 EHRR 539. 
 
90
 The Preamble to the Charter refers to a wider range of non-exhaustive sources for Charter rights: the 
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the TEU, the 
Community Treaties, the ECHR, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of 
Europe, and the case law of the Court of Justice and Court of Human Rights.  
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 Case 4/73, Nold  v. Commission [1974] ECR 491, at para.14. 
 
92
 Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v Austria [2003], at paras. 79 and 80. 
 
93
 Cases 60 and 61/84, Cinéthèque v. Fédèration Nationale des Cinémas Français [1985] ECR 2605; and 
Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schäbish Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719.  
 
94
 Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925 and Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familapress Zeitungsverlags- 
und Vertreibs GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689. In such cases, the Court of Justice also 
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Insofar as the second category is concerned, the general provision controlling the exercise 
of derogations is Article 52(1) of the Charter, reproduced in Article II-52(1): “Any 
limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be 
provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the 
principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others”. This provision is based on the Court of 
Justice’s case law on the permitted scope of derogations.95  Charter rights corresponding 
to ECHR rights have, however, also to be read subject to the first sentence of Article 
52(3) of the Charter, reproduced in Article II-52(3), which provides that the “meaning 
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down” by the ECHR. WG II 
interprets this provision to mean it “includes notably the detailed provisions in the ECHR 
which permit limitations of these rights”.96  WG II does not, however, clarify whether the 
second sentence of Article 52(3),97 which provides the provision shall ‘not prevent Union 
law providing more extensive protection’ than the ECHR and is retained in draft Article 
II-52(3), would mean the limitation provisions in the ECHR could also be more strictly 
construed by the Court of Justice. Such an interpretation would be welcome as permitting 
a higher standard of protection to be developed by the Court of Justice. As regards rights 
in the Charter that correspond to the non-derogable rights set out in the ECHR,98 it seems 
reasonable to argue by analogy that they should be construed as not being capable of 
restriction under Article II-52(1) on the basis such restriction would breach the minimum 
equivalent standard of Article II-52(3).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
subjects the application of a derogation to the principle of proportionality and a narrow construction of the 
grounds for exercising such derogations:  Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski, [2000] ECR I –1935.   
 
95
 See the Explanations, op. cit., at 48. 
 
96
 The Report, at 7. The Explanations, op. cit., also follow this interpretation, although adding: ‘..without 
thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of Community law and that of the Court of Justice ..’, at 48. See 
further on the ‘autonomy’ issue section 6 below. 
 
97
 The Report provides this provision serves to clarify Article 52(3) ‘does not prevent more extensive 
protection already achieved or which may subsequently be provided for (i) in Union legislation and (ii) in 
some articles of the Charter which, although based on the ECHR, go beyond the ECHR because Union law 
acquis had already achieved a higher level of protection (e.g., Article 47 on effective judicial protection, or 
Article 50 on the right not to be punished twice for the same offence)’. 
 
98
 These are, pursuant to Article 15 ECHR, the right to life (Article 2), the prohibition of torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3), the prohibition of slavery or servitude (Article 4(1)) and 
the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal laws (Article 7): see J.Fitzpatrick in L.Henkin and 
J.L.Hargrove, op. cit., at 209. The corresponding Charter rights are set out in Articles 2, 4, 5 and 49: see the 
Explanations, op. cit. 
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As regards Charter rights derived from the EC Treaty or the EU Treaty,99 Article 52(2) 
has been retained substantially unamended as Article II-52(2): “Rights recognized by this 
Charter for which provision is made in other Parts of the Constitution shall be exercised 
under the conditions and within the limits defined by these relevant Parts”.  WG II 
recommended retention of Article 52(2), subject to the necessary technical drafting 
amendments to reflect the Charter’s incorporation,100 to ensure “complete compatibility 
between the statements of the rights in the Charter and their more detailed regulation as 
currently found in the EC Treaty”.101  In contrast to Article II-52(3), therefore,  Charter 
rights which correspond to an EC or EU Treaty right  pursuant to Article 52(2) may be 
subject to the same restrictions and “do not enjoy broader protection than the original 
rights”.102 
 
Thirdly, until the Union accedes to the ECHR it obviously cannot avail of the specific 
derogation provisions in Article 15 ECHR.103 The accession treaty of the Union to the 
ECHR will clearly have to address the terms on which the Union can avail of Article 15. 
Although the CDDH Report proposed that terms referring specifically to states in the 
ECHR should apply mutatis mutandis to the Union, without redefining each such term so 
as ‘to tailor them to the EC/EU, which would be a highly complicated exercise’,104 it is 
doubtful that that such a broad-brush approach could be applied to the criteria established 
by the Court of Human Rights to control the exercise of derogations under Article 15.105 
Rather than relying on the Court of Human Rights to develop a new version of the 
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 “These relate to rights to freedom of movement, almost all the rights in the “citizenship” chapter of the 
Charter (right to vote, access to documents, right of petition, etc.) and the clauses relating to non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality and equality between the sexes”: Working Document 9 of WG II 
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100
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Lawless formula to apply to the Union, it would be preferable for the accession treaty to 
establish separate derogation criteria appropriate for the Union. 
 
In conclusion, incorporation of the Charter and accession by the Union to the ECHR 
would provide substantial benefits in clarifying and strengthening the law applicable to 
derogations from fundamental rights in Union law. Article II-52(1) will codify and 
entrench106 the case law of the Court of Justice on controlling restrictions on fundamental 
rights in respect of Charter rights and accession to the ECHR will provide a well 
established control mechanism  by the Court of Human Rights of derogations by the 
Union from its ECHR obligations. However, as this brief analysis of the conditions for 
the control of the exercise of derogations in Union law has demonstrated, the complexity 
and duplication of sources for fundamental rights protection under the proposals in the 
draft Constitution strongly militates in favour of simplification by removing reference to 
general principles of law as a source of fundamental rights under Article I-7(3).   
 
 
 
5. Enforceability of fundamental rights under the Union’s Constitution 
 
The relationship of fundamental rights to the legal order has long been debated and in 
particular whether a necessary connection to effective enforcement mechanisms must 
exist for fundamental rights to progress beyond, in Bentham’s phrase, “nonsense on 
stilts”.107  In the Union’s political process, however, fundamental rights discourse fulfills 
a number of functions, some of which are not dependent on legal enforcement 
mechanisms.108 For example, the role played by the European Parliament in promoting a 
coherent fundamental rights policy in the Union also served as a means of expanding “its 
powers and responsibilities to topics which did not actually fall within its normal 
remit”.109 However, it is generally agreed that increased rights of access to judicial 
enforcement mechanisms is a key element in promoting the effective protection of 
fundamental rights.110   
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In addition to accession by the Union to the ECHR and incorporation of the Charter, the 
principal reform proposals made in the context of the Union to achieve this objective 
have included: the relaxation of the standing requirements under Article 230(4) TEC; the 
creation of an individual human rights complaint procedure; and access to the Court of 
Justice for public interest institutions.111 WG II considered and rejected the idea of 
creating a special procedure for the protection of fundamental rights before the Court of 
Justice;112 it decided not to make any recommendations to the Convention on the reform 
of Article 230(4) TEC;113 and it did not consider the issue of locus standi for public 
interest institutions. Part III of the draft Constitution only addresses the first issue in 
Article III-270(4), which is a substantial reworking of Article 230(4) to take account of 
the change in the denomination of the Union’s legal instruments.114 Article III-270(4) 
constitutes a partial loosening of the “direct and individual concern” test as regards a 
“regulatory act” but not an “act”115  by providing that any natural or legal person may 
challenge a regulatory act which is “of direct concern to him or her and does not entail 
implementing measures”.   
 
WG II did, however, briefly refer to the “possibility of a provision in the Treaty on the 
obligation of Member States, as spelt out in the recent case law, to provided for effective 
remedies for rights derived from Union law”.116  This proposal was taken up in Article I-
28, paragraph 2: “The Member States shall provide rights of appeal sufficient to ensure 
effective legal protection in the field of Union law”. This is no doubt intended to buttress 
the obligation of sincere co-operation incumbent on the Member States under Article 10 
TEC and restated in Articles I-5(2) and I-10(2) of the draft Constitution and codifies the 
existing case law of the Court of Justice.117 As regards the widely acknowledged lacunae 
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in judicial protection in respect of Third Pillar measures,118 WG II took the view the issue 
was outside its remit.119 Working Group X on ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’ concluded 
that “the general system of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice should be extended to the 
area of freedom, security and justice, including action by Union bodies in this field”.120  
The Convention followed this recommendation since Article III-270(1) provides 
jurisdiction for the Court of Justice to review “the legality of European laws and 
framework laws, of acts of the Council of Ministers, of the Commission and of the 
European Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the 
European Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties” which 
includes the acts which may be adopted under Chapter IV of Part III of the draft 
Constitution relating to the “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”.   
 
In the context of improved access to justice, the two most significant benefits from 
implementation of the draft Constitution would be the individual right of application 
under Article 34 of the ECHR and the possibility for individuals to avail of Charter rights 
directly  before the Court of Justice and national courts. Both issues were, however, only 
briefly discussed by WG II.121  The effect of incorporation of the Charter on creating 
justiciable rights for individuals is the more problematic. Incorporation of the Charter 
would, according to WG II, make ‘the Union’s present system of remedies available’.122  
This makes the point that incorporation of the Charter would result in Charter rights 
being directly justiciable by the Court of Justice and national courts applying Union law 
rather than, as presently, indirectly as a source for general principles of Union law. In 
addition, the extension of the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction under the draft Constitution 
in the “area of freedom, security and justice” would materially enlarge the scope of the 
justiciability of Charter rights.  However, the retention of a modified version of Article 
51(1) of the Charter in Article II-51(1) seems designed to retain the fundamental structure 
of the Charter as an instrument of judicial review rather than conferring on individuals a 
remedy for an alleged violation of a Charter right independently of “an accessory 
instrument which violates a rights included in the Charter”.123 The introduction of an 
independent remedy based on an alleged violation of fundamental rights was 
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canvassed124 but rejected by WG II and the Convention. A person seeking to seek a 
judicial remedy for a breach of a Charter right will therefore have to bring themselves 
within the scope of one of the existing judicial remedies.125   
 
 
6. Accession to the ECHR: the Union at last? 
 
Convergence between the Community institutions and those of the Council of Europe had 
already been discussed at the time of the founding of the Communities.126  Although the 
original Treaties did not incorporate any reference to the ECHR, or indeed any 
fundamental rights standards, the Court of Justice in a series of cases beginning with 
Rutili127 made explicit reference to the ECHR.  The Parliament, Council and Commission 
issued a Joint Declaration of 5 April 1977 concerning the Protection of Fundamental 
Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms128 confirming their respect for the fundamental rights protected 
under the Court of Justice’s case law on general principles, including those derived from 
the ECHR. In 1979 the Commission reversed its earlier opposition to accession by the 
Communities to the ECHR.129  Article F(2) TEU, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty 
and renumbered as Article 6(2) by the Amsterdam Treaty, enshrined the fundamental 
rights protected by the ECHR as general principles of Community law.  In November 
1993 the Council submitted the issue of accession by the Community to the ECHR for an 
opinion under Article 300(6) TEC but the Court of Justice concluded that the Community 
did not have competence to accede to the EC Treaty and accession would require its 
amendment under Article 236 TEC (now Article 48 TEU).130  The intergovernmental 
conferences leading up to the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties did not, however, amend the 
Treaties to permit accession. The issue of the accession to the ECHR was raised at the 
Laeken European Council meeting of December 2001 and submitted for consideration by 
the European Convention.131 
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The recommendation of WG II to include a constitutional authorisation enabling the 
Union to accede to the ECHR132 was in this context hardly controversial.133 The 
Convention broadly accepted the recommendation but strengthened its terms from an 
authorisation to an injunction in Article I-7(2): “The Union shall seek accession to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Accession to that Convention shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the 
Constitution”. This obligation is tempered, however, by the provision in Article III-
227(7) that accession shall be subject to the consent of the European Parliament and in 
Article III-227(9) that the Council must act unanimously throughout the accession 
procedure.134  
 
The inclusion of the second  sentence in Article I-7(2), specifying that accession to the  
ECHR shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the draft Constitution,  was 
the result of a proposal of WG II135 and was one of three “technical devices” it 
recommended to ensure the “Union’s accession to the ECHR does not modify the 
allocation of competences” between the Union and the Member States.136  WG II was 
concerned to ensure that accession by the Union to the ECHR “would thus not lead to any 
extension of the Union’s competences, let alone to the establishment of a general 
competence of the Union on fundamental rights”.137 However, WG II never set out how 
accession to the ECHR could lead to such results and indeed acknowledges that the 
preparatory work for accession proceeded on the opposite assumption.138  In any event 
the definition of the Union’s competences as set out in the draft Constitution are so fluid 
that the statement in Article I-7(2) that accession to the ECHR shall not ‘affect’  the 
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Union’s competences seems too broad: accession may well constrain, and thus affect,  the 
Union’s competences.   
 
A further issue arising from accession to the ECHR is the extent to which the Court of 
Justice will be obliged to follow the case law of the Court of Human Rights on the 
interpretation of the ECHR.139 Specific references to the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Human Rights by the Court of Justice had until recently been infrequent140 and it has 
been argued that the Court of Justice “is not legally obliged to follow the interpretation of 
the European Court of Human Rights”.141  The details of the structuring of the 
relationship between the Court of Justice and the Court of Human Rights will be crucial 
in determining whether the Court of Human Rights is to be recognized as a superior court 
to the Court of Justice as regards interpretation of the ECHR following accession.142  It is 
submitted that the terms of accession of the Union to the ECHR should make clear that 
the Court of Justice should be bound to follow a ruling of the Court of Human Rights in 
order to maximize the benefits of accession by the Union to the ECHR143 and to avoid 
possible conflicts between the Union’s legal order and the ECHR.144 Article II-52(3) 
would in any event oblige the Court of Justice to review the relevant case law of the 
Court of Human Rights in order to ensure that those Charter rights which correspond to 
ECHR rights have the same “meaning and scope” as the ECHR rights.    
 
A wider but related issue relates to the principle of the autonomy of the Union’s legal 
order. WG II was of the opinion that this principle would not place any legal obstacle to 
accession since the “Court of Justice would remain the sole supreme arbiter of questions 
of Union law and on the validity of Union Acts; the European Court of Human Rights 
could not be regarded as a superior Court but rather as a specialized court exercising 
external control over the international law obligations of the Union resulting from 
accession to the ECHR”.145  This conclusion is, however, debatable. As the CDDH 
Report makes clear, a procedure before the Court of Justice would not be considered a 
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procedure of “international investigation or settlement” in the sense of Article 35(2)(b) 
ECHR and “the mere fact that a case has been dealt with by the Luxembourg Court 
should not prevent the Strasbourg Court from accepting an application as admissible”.146  
If the Court of Human Rights found that a judgment of the Court of Justice had failed to 
protect an ECHR right, the Court of Justice would be obliged to follow the decision of 
the Court of Human Rights under Article 46(1) ECHR, provided the Union was a party to 
the proceedings before the Court of Human Rights.  Furthermore, proposed changes to 
the ECHR whereby the Committee of Ministers would be given power to institute 
infringement proceedings “against a State that would persistently refuse to comply with a 
judgment of the Court”,147 could apply to a persistent failure by the Court of Justice to 
adopt its interpretation of the ECHR to that of the Court of Human Rights.  
 
7. Incorporation of the Charter: A Bill of Rights for the Union? 
 
A "bill of rights is a formal commitment to the protection of those rights which are 
considered, at that moment in history, to be of particular importance. It is, in principle, 
binding upon the government and can be overridden, if at all, only with significant 
difficulty. Some form of redress is provided in the event that violations occur”.148  It is 
the purpose of this section to evaluate whether incorporation of the Charter would 
provide the Union with a bill of rights according to Philip Alston’s definition. The other 
elements of the Union’s protection of fundamental rights set out in Article I-7, accession 
to the ECHR and retention of fundamental rights as general principles of law, are not 
included in this analysis since, as has been argued, retention of the general principles 
would add little of substance to the Charter rights and principles149 and, until the terms of 
accession by the Union to the ECHR are negotiated, it is difficult to assess the 
contribution of Union accession to the ECHR. 
 
It is reasonably clear that the Charter satisfies Philip Alston’s first criterion both in the 
form it was adopted in December 2000 and a fortiori if incorporated on the terms set out 
in the draft Constitution. The fourth paragraph of the Charter’s Preamble in both versions 
clearly affirms its claim to modernity through its mission to “strengthen the protection of 
fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress and scientific and 
technological developments by making those rights more visible in a Charter” and the 
breadth of the rights recognized by the Charter has generally been acknowledged.  
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As regards the binding nature of the Charter on the Union’s government, this would be 
achieved through the combined effect of Article I-7(1) and the reformulated version of 
Article 51(1) of the Charter set out in Article II-51(1). Article I-7(1) requires the Union to 
“recognise the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter” and Article II-51(1) 
requires the “institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union with due regard for the 
principle of subsdiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing 
Union law” to “respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application 
thereof  in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the 
powers of the Union as conferred on it in the other Parts of the Constitution”.150 It is 
difficult to justify the differences in terminology between Article I-7(1) and II-51(1) other 
than by reference to the perceived political imperative  of retaining and strengthening the 
jurisdictional elements of Article 51(1) of the Charter. Nevertheless, it is clear that that 
the incorporated Charter would create binding legal obligations on the Union’s governing 
institutions and any failure to fulfill those obligations within the parameters set out in the 
Constitution would found an action for judicial review of acts adopted in breach of those 
obligations. Incorporation of the Charter on the terms of the draft Constitution would 
alter the normative status of the Charter by allowing direct judicial reference to the 
Charter rather than through the indirect route of the general principles case law.151 
 
“So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason, and from Scripture, 
that the sovereign power, whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly 
of men, as in popular, and aristocratical commonwealths, is as great, as possibly men can 
be imagined to make it”.152  While Thomas Hobbes would no doubt have needed some 
persuading of the merits of entrenching constitutional fundamental rights,153 
incorporation of the Charter on the terms of the draft Constitution will achieve 
entrenchment according to the definition formulated by Philip Alston. Article IV-7 
elaborates on the current procedure for amending the TEU and TEC under Article 48 
TEU but retains the core requirements that any amendments to the Constitution require 
firstly the “common accord” of the conference of the representatives of the governments 
of the Member States and secondly the ratification of the amendments by each of the 
Member States “in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”. Both 
from the perspective of historical precedent and the Union’s enlargement, it would be 
difficult to argue against the proposition that overriding the Charter rights by amendment 
to the Constitution could only be done “with significant difficulty”.  
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The final characteristic of a bill of rights according to Philip Alston’s definition, requiring 
some form of redress to be provided in the event that violations of rights occur, is the 
most problematic under the Charter’s existing status and would so remain, albeit  to a 
more limited extent,  if the Charter were  incorporated on the terms of the draft 
Constitution.  In particular, the limitation of the scope of application of Charter rights 
under Article II-51 would pose real problems of effective judicial redress: “Insofar as the 
Charter contains rights which are not based on the E.C. Treaty or E.U. Treaty, these 
rights can offer legal protection only to the extent that they relate to the current exercise 
of powers by the Community, the Union or the Member States implementing Union law. 
The statement of rights that cannot be linked to such an exercise of power mainly has a 
political function”.154  There may therefore be an infringement of Charter rights which, 
independently of the issue of the adequacy of Union remedies for breaches of 
fundamental rights, will not be subject to legal redress since it falls outside the 
competence of Union law. While it could be argued that there is no infringement, since 
Article II-51 defines Charter rights so as to exclude their application in such a situation, 
such an argument is unattractive since instead of making the Charter rights ‘more 
visible’,155 incorporation threatens to make them more illusory.   
 
In conclusion, the incorporation of the Charter on the terms of the draft Constitution falls 
at the last hurdle when measured against the criteria for a bill of rights identified by 
Philip Alston.  While it may justifiably be argued that such a restriction on the scope of 
the Charter rights is inevitable to maintain the jurisdictional balance between the Union 
and the Member States and render the Charter politically acceptable,156 the Charter rights 
could nevertheless have been redrafted to take account of the Union’s competences under 
the draft Constitution. However, such a task was outside the remit of WG II and never a 
political option for the Convention. 
 
8.  Conclusion – success at a price 
 
In recommending the incorporation of the Charter and authorization for the Union to 
accede to the ECHR, WG II has made two important contributions to the draft 
Constitution and, if they are implemented,  the protection of fundamental rights in the 
Union will benefit from a transparent, principled and securely entrenched constitutional 
basis. The subsequent accession by the Union to the ECHR would provide an 
autonomous system of control over the protection of fundamental rights and an important 
additional bulwark against any abuse of the Union’s enhanced powers, particularly in the 
“common area of freedom, security and justice” currently covered by the Third Pillar and 
Title IV TEC.  
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While both of these proposals were predictable, the potential opposition of some Member 
States to either or both of these measures meant that WG II was conservative both in its 
approach to the terms on which the Charter should be incorporated and in its analysis of 
the effect on the Union’s legal order of accession to the ECHR. As a result, several of the 
subsidiary recommendations in the Report were prompted more by a desire to smooth the 
passage of the primary recommendations than a principled reflection on the role of 
fundamental rights protection under the new Constitution. In particular, the retention of 
general principles as a source of fundamental rights under the new Constitution would 
undermine from a rule of law perspective the benefits of having a codified system of 
protection in the Charter and the ECHR.  In a similar vein, the drafting amendments to 
the Charter incorporated in the draft Constitution appear driven by the need to assuage 
Member State sensibility as to the allocation of competences in the field of fundamental 
rights protection and detract from the existing text of the Charter.157 
 
Political reality suggests that the IGC is unlikely to devote substantial time to the detailed 
amendments resulting from the proposals of WG II.  Incorporation of the Charter and a 
mandate for the Union to accede to the ECHR no longer seem controversial, at least at 
the IGC level, and the additional ‘safeguards’ built into the draft Constitution against an 
encroachment of Union competence in the protection of fundamental rights are unlikely 
to be challenged but rather welcomed as a useful armory to deploy in the struggle to 
secure ratification of the new Constitution. The contentious issues for the future 
development of fundamental rights protection in the Union are more likely to center on 
the terms of accession of the Union to the ECHR and alternative mechanisms for 
updating fundamental rights protection if Council unanimity is required for amendments 
of the new Constitution. While the ‘technical’ amendments resulting from the Report 
may seem of minor significance in comparison, it would be regrettable if the IGC fails to 
take full advantage of this unique opportunity to establish a unified, coherent and 
simplified constitutional basis for the protection of fundamental rights in the Union.  
 
                                                 
157
 The British position is set out in Cmnd 5934, op. cit., at para.102.  
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